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INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS IN THE TOURISM INDUSTRY: 





This study investigates the short-run and long-run price performances of tour- 
ism-related IPOs that listed on Taiwan's two stock exchanges between 1982 and 
2002. Taiwan's tourism industry has seen an increasing number of firms going pub- 
lic in recent years. Results are consistent with other studies that IPOs are generally 
underpriced. The degree of underpricing is more severe when the stock is pur- 
chased at the initial offer price. However, it is still smaller than the overall IPO mar- 
kets in Taiwan, as well as the tourism IPOs in the U.S. After removal of outliers, the 
island's tourism IPOs perform poorly one year after IPO relative to the market 
benchmark, while the overall IPO markets show no abnormal return one year after 
IPO. Moreover, both the magnitude of short-run underpricing and long-run under- 
performance exhibit wide variations among the sample firms. 
Introduction 
There has been huge interest in recent years in the research of the apparent IPO (ini- 
tial public offering) underpricing phenomenon, or high initial IPO return, in which the 
first-day traded price is generally above the offer price. Loughran and Ritter (2002) find 
that the average first-day return can be as high as 14.1 percent after studying nearly 3,000 
IPOs during 1990 and 1998. In the heyday of bull markets in the late 1990s, some Internet- 
related firms' IPOs saw first-day run-ups of 200 to 400 percent. Such "IPO underpricing," 
as Ritter (2002) claims, has been widely documented in operating companies not only in 
the U.S., but also in other countries. Only non-operating companies such as closed-end 
funds or real estate investment trusts (REITs) show no evidence of significant underpric- 
ing on the first day after IPO, according to Ritter (2002). 
This well-known anomaly casts doubt on the notion of market efficiency. Some 
researchers have begun to believe that there must be some inefficient market mechanisms 
causing this kind of anomaly. On the other hand, others researchers believe that such an 
anomaly is a result of market equilibrium. For example, Ibboston (1975) offers a list of 
possible explanations for underpricing, and several theories have also been developed to 
show why IPOs are intentionally underpriced. However, these explanations are gener- 
ally based upon information asymmetry, agency conflict, share allocation, lawsuit avoid- 
ance, and signaling (see, for example, Grinblatt & Hwang, 1989; Chemmanur, 1993; 
Loughran, Ritter, & Rydqvist, 1994; Ritter, 2002). From the underwriter's point of view, 
such underpricing is often necessary in order to reduce the cost of marketing the issue 
and to lure investors to buy the stock. 
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Most studies on IPOs have concentrated on the characteristics of short-term under- 
pricing. Yet, another controversial facet in IPO research that has similarly attracted and 
further puzzled academics in recent years is the long-term stock performance after initial 
public offerings. Based on the argument of market efficiency, post-IPO stock perform- 
ances should simply reflect the stocks' intrinsic value; the method of valuation should be 
just like any other non-IPO stocks; and the performances should not exhibit any predict- 
able pattern. However, researchers (see, for example, Ritter, 1991; Loughran & Ritter, 
1995; Brav, 2000; Eckbo & Norli, 2001) have found that the long-term stock performances 
of IPOs tend to be poor, indicating that investors are too optimistic about the prospect of 
the IPO firms although the magnitude of underperformance is sensitive to procedure and 
time period employed. Levis (1993) and Page and Reyneke (1997) provide a similar long- 
run underperformance from the U.K. and Turkey, respectively. IPO underperformance 
not only extends to other countries, but also to seasoned equity offerings. Several hypoth- 
eses have been proposed to explain this anomaly such as listing timing selection, earn- 
ings manipulation, market cycle, or insufficient internal funds to finance future projects 
(see, for example, Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998; Page & Reyneke, 1997). 
Ritter (2002) provides a detailed review on the theory and empirical evidence of IPO 
short-term and long-term activities. However, before we accept these two phenomena as 
examples of true facts of market inefficiency observed in the IPO markets not only in the 
U.S. but also overseas, Fama (1998) critically reviews these market anomalies and sug- 
gests that the short-term underpricing and long-term underperformance phenomena 
merit further examination. It is thus clear that there is scope for more studies. 
The motivations for focusing on the tourism industry in this paper are twofold. First, 
it seems that the characteristics of tourism IPOs may be different from those of other 
industries, and tourism IPOs may be treated and valued separately from others by the 
underwriters during the underwriting process. Canina (1996) argues that "underwriters 
may view the primary issue of most hotel and casino stocks as more risky than stocks of 
new companies generally." Second, we have also observed a growing number of IPO 
activities in the entire U.S. tourism industry during the 1990s. The average number of 
tourism-related firms that went public per year almost doubled in the 1990s relative to 
the 1980s. However, despite the growing number of IPOs in the tourism industry, the 
analysis of tourism IPOs has still basically gone unnoticed by the academics. Thus, it 
seems reasonable to re-examine the robustness of the U.S. findings by using data from 
non-U.S. countries. 
Atkinson and LeBruto (1995) examine 14 IPOs in the gaming industry for the period 
1992-1993. They support previous findings that IPO investments made at the offer price 
have returns superior to standard indices, implying that these issues are underpriced. 
Canina (1996) finds evidence that the magnitude of IPO underpricing is larger for casino- 
lodging stocks over the 1979-1997 period, compared to restaurant IPOs and the overall 
IPO markets. This observed phenomenon indicates that when casino-lodging firms' 
stocks go public, they are underpaid relative to others. She also shows that, similar to 
other IPO studies, the degree of underpricing is related to the reputation of the under- 
writer, as well as the business cycle. However, there is some favorable news. The level of 
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underpricing consistently falls in the sample period possibly due to the increasing famil- 
iarity with IPOs in the industry thereby causing a decline in uncertainty about the indus- 
try's future prospects. Moreover, IPOs in the hospitality industry, including restaurants 
and lodging-casino firms, generally outperform the S&P 500 index by 14.11 percent one 
year after the issue. The phenomenon of long-term poor performance after an IPO is not 
found in the hospitality industry. 
Except for the two published studies mentioned earlier, the international evidence in 
this area is poor. As the number of IPOs has increased in Taiwan, there has also been a 
wave of tourism-related companies choosing to raise their equity capital in Taiwan's 
stock exchanges since in the 1990s. Traditionally, only big hotels could raise their equity 
capital in the stock markets, but some large travel agencies and firms in the entertain- 
ment theme park segments of the hospitality industry have gradually begun to see the 
stock market as an attractive source to finance new projects, expand operations, or just 
start up business. Thus, it is an interesting topic to further investigate if tourism-related 
firms behave differently from others in the stock IPO markets in Taiwan. Such an under- 
standing should be important for both portfolio managers and investment bankers who 
wish to invest in this market. This study is, to our knowledge, the first study to examine 
tourism IPO performances utilizing data from the Asia Pacific region, i.e., Taiwan. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section I1 reviews the listing devel- 
opment of tourism-related firms in Taiwan's two stock exchanges. Section I11 discusses 
data and methodology used in the study. Section IV presents the empirical results. Sec- 
tion V summarizes our findings. 
Tourism Industry in Taiwan's Stock Exchanges 
Taiwan's stock market is the third largest in Asia, and there are two major stock 
exchanges for traded securities: the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and the R.O.C. Over- 
the-Counter Security Exchange (ROSE). The TSE represents the main board, but the trad- 
ing mechanisms for both exchanges are almost the same except for some differences in 
, 
listing requirements and margin constraints. As of December 2002, there was a total of 
I 
j I 
638 companies listed on the TSE with a total market capitalization of NT$9.09 trillion 
(US$268 billion). In 1992, only 256 companies were listed on the TSE with a total market 
capitalization of NT$2.55 trillion (US$75 billion). 
Before the establishment of the TSE in 1961, all shares trading were considered over 
the counter. The OTC was reinstated in 1988 in order to provide small and medium enter- 
prises with a forum for capital raising activities. As of the end of 1992, there were only 11 
companies quoted on the ROSE with a total paid-in-capital value of NT$9.7 billion. How- 
ever, the growth of the OTC market has been very rapid. The number of listed firms 
jumped to 384 and the market value increased to NT$862 billion by the end of 2002. 
Table 1 reports firms from the segment of the tourism industry that went public in 
the TSE or ROSE between 1982 and 2002. During this 20-year period, only 10 firms met 
our criteria, of which five firms chose to list on the TSE and the other five firms chose to 
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list on the ROSE. These listed firms come from almost every segment of the tourism 
industry. Although most of the listed firms are still concentrated in the hotel industry (six 
firms), other segments of the tourism industry (four firms) have also come out in recent 
years. Three tourism-related firms with a listing day earlier than 1982 are therefore 
dropped. One restaurant company with a listing day after December 31, 2002, is also 
omitted due to insufficient trading dates to measure its long-term IPO performance.' 
Although the sample size is too small to draw a conclusive statistical inference, our 
results still provide some important emerging market evidence in the study of tourism 
and hospitality stock IPOs 
Table 1 
IPO of the tourism industry in Taiwan 
Firm Name 
IPO Size 
(in thousands Offer Price 
Listing Date of NT$) (NT$) 
Listed on the TSE 
Ambassador Hotel Hotel 11 / 101 1982 
Leofoo Development Hotel and 121241 1988 
Amusement 
Park 
First Hotel Hotel 06 / 25 / 1991 
Formosa International Hotel Hotel 03 / 09 / 1998 
Holiday Entertainment Karaoke Pub 11 / 30/2000 
Listed on the ROSE 
Janfusun Fancy World Theme Park 031 121 1998 
Tung Ho Development Healthclub 12/23/1998 
Ritz Landis Hotel Hotel 061 151 1999 
Royal Chihpen Hotel Hotel 12/21/1999 
Phoenix Tours Travel Agency 11 / 301 2001 
As mentioned earlier, many firms in the non-hotel segment of the tourism industry 
have rushed to the stock exchanges for capital in recent years. Holiday Entertainment is a 
good example. The company is a very famous karaoke pub with many branches, not only 
New Palace is in the restaurant business and listed its stock on the ROSE on January 17,2003. 
It is also the first firm in the restaurant business to choose to raise equity in an organized exchange 
in Taiwan. 
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in Taiwan, but also in other countries. The company usually relies heavily on internal 
equity with relatively less debt for financing, but its stock went public in November 2000. 
Janfusun Fancy World, an entertainment theme park, is also the first firm of its kind that 
went to the stock exchange for the selling of its shares. Phoenix Tours is also the first 
travel agency that has ever listed equity shares either on the TSE or the ROSE. Tung Ho 
Development's main business includes operating health clubs in some major cities, as 
well as sporting clubs and country clubs in rural areas. The company is part of the Uni- 
President Group, which is one of the largest business conglomerates in Taiwan. 
We observe that the late 1990s was a booming period for tourism IPOs; 7 out of 10 
IPOs of our sample went public after 1998.~ We believe this trend could be partly attrib- 
uted to the expansion and growth during the bull markets of the same period. However, 
there is no doubt that in the future more firms from various segments of the tourism 
industry will select an organized stock exchange for funding and liquidity. Canina (1996) 
finds that the average size of tourism-company IPOs is less than the average size of the 
overall market. In our sample, we can only argue that the size of the IPOs varies across 
the sample from the lowest of NT $22 million for Phoenix Tours to the largest of NT $1.3 
billion for Ambassador Hotel. 
Data and Research Design 
This paper employs data for 10 tourism firms that went IPO on the TSE or ROSE 
between 1982 to 2002. The post-IPO price and return data used in this study are obtained 
from the Taiwan Economic Journal, which is a local data vendor, and the AREMOS data- 
base provided by the TaiwanEconomicData Center . IPO information, such as offer price, 
number of shares issued, and listing date, is retrieved from the prospectus of each issue 
and is double checked from data provided on the Websites of the TSE and the ROSE. 
The objective of this study is to investigate the short-term and long-term return per- 
formance of tourism-related IPOs. Thus, we use three measures of stock returns and also 
three intervals in this study: first-day IPO initial return, short-term (up to eight-week 
post-IPO) holding-period returns, and long-term (one-year post-IPO) market-adjusted 
abnormal returns. The first two measures are intended to evaluate the short-term price 
behavior, and the last one examines the long-term performance. The first-day initial 
return lniRi is defined as: 
where Pil the closing price on the first trading day of IPO i and Pio is the offer price of 
IPO i. 
Following Atkinson and LeBruto (1995), we also calculate the initial return for each 
of the 10 firms if the investor cannot buy the stock at the offer price and has to wait until 
Canina (1996) documents that tourism IPOs have experienced hot and cold cycles in which 
the number of issues varies substantially across different time periods. 
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the end of the first trading day. This allows us to compare the investment made at the 
offer price since both of the holding periods are the same. In this case, the first-day return 
&,I based on the closing price is: 
T,2 Ri,l = - - 17 
e,1 
where Pi,l and 3 2  are the closing prices on the first and second trading day of IF0 i, 
respectively. Note that in Taiwan the daily price limit of five percent was relaxed to seven 
percent after October 1989. It is not unusual for an IPO share to have continuous limit- 
price moves due to the daily price limit and severe ~nderpricing.~ If this is the case, then 
both initial returns from Equations 1 and 2 would be equal, and it would be impossible to 
tell the difference between the price behavior of tourism-related IPOs and non-tourism- 
related IPOs. For this reason, we next compute the short-term holding-period return up 
to a holding period of 1 , 2  4, and 8 weeks after the IPO. 
If an investor can buy stock in the individual firm at the offer price, then the holding- 
period return for IPO firm i is calculated as: 
HPR,,, = (1 + IniRi)(l +Ri,l )(I+ Rip, ). ... .(l +Rip ) - 1, 
T,t+l -e,t 
where R i ~  is the daily return and defined as T t  , t =l....n, and 4,t is the 
closing price for IPO i on day t. Similarly, if the investor waits until the end of the first 
day to buy the stock at the closing price, then the holding-period return for IPO i, exclud- 
ing the initial return, is calculated as: 
HPR,,, = (1 +Ri,,)(l+ R,,,) ..... (1 +Ri,,) -1. 
The average return and standard deviation for the group as a whole for each time 
period are computed as well. We then calculate the reward ratio, which is defined by 
dividing the average return by the standard deviation. This ratio shows the amount of 
return (mean return) from one unit of variability (standard deviation) from this group of 
stocks during a particular time period. 
To examine the long-term post-IPO price behavior, we calculate the market-adjusted 
(excess) returns in which the one-year post-IPO daily holding-period return is subtracted 
by the daily holding-period return in the benchmark portfolio of the same duration. 
Mathematically, it can be described as: 
Huang (1999) estimates that in Taiwan the average length between the listing day and the 
first non-limit trading day is about 9.5 days, ranging from 1 to 53 with a median of 7.5. 
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MAR, = [ f i ( R , ,  + 1) -11 - [ f i (R;  + 1) -1 1, 
t=1 t=l 
M 
where MAR, is the one-year post-IPO market adjusted return of IPO i and Ri7t is the 
corresponding market benchmark return, which is proxied by the Taiwan Weighted 
Stock Index return on day t. The index is a capitalization-weighted index compiled by 
the TSE and includes all listed stocks in the Exchange and is the most commonly-used 
market index. Equation 5 measures the one-year holding-period excess return where the 
IPO share is purchased at the first-day closing market price.4 Clearly, an MAR, greater 
than zero indicates that the IPO stock outperforms the corresponding market return; an 
MAR, less than zero shows that the IPO stock underperforms the corresponding bench- 
mark return. 
Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports the results for the first-day returns for each of the 10 firms and as a 
whole group as well. The numbers in the second and third columns show that the new 
issues are bought at the offer and first-day closing prices, respectively. It is clear that first- 
day underpricing is much more evident if investors can purchase at the offer price rather 
than at the closing price. The average return for the 10 tourism firms in our sample based 
on the offer price is 2.68 percent. However, if based on the first-day closing price, then the 
average return is only 1.07 percent. The return range based on the offer price also shows a 
smaller variability, resulting in a much higher reward ratio of 0.58. 
Therefore, the first-day initial return based on the offer price is excluded. 
The Journal of Hospitality Financial Management 
Table 2 
First-day initial return (%) 
- 
Firm Name Based on Offer Price Based on First-Day Closing Price 
- - - - - - 




Formosa International Hotel 
Holiday Entertainment 
Listed on the ROSE 
Janfusun Fancy World 
Tung Ho Development 
Ritz Landis Hotel 







The magnitude of underpricing for these 10 tourism firms in Taiwan is much less 
than their counterparts in the U.S. Canina (1996) reports a first-day return of 16.32 per- 
cent for 143 hospitality firms from 1979 to 1994 in the U.S. However, we note that in Tai- 
wan, there is a one-day price limit of seven percent both for the TSE and the ROSE after 
October 1989.~ Hence, we are not surprised to find a much smaller number. Our findings 
basically support that the IPO stocks in the tourism industry are underpriced, but they 
should be made based on the offer price, not the first-day closing price. 
Although first-day underpricing in the tourism IPO is clear, the degree of underpric- 
ing is smaller than the first-day return of the overall Taiwan IPO market. Huang (1999) 
examines Taiwan's IPO markets from 1971 to 1995 and finds that the average numbers of 
trading days from the listing day to the first non-limit trading day is 9.5, indicating that 
Before October 1989, the daily price limit was five percent. 
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most IPO stocks have continuous price jumps of seven percent (or five percent before 
October 1989) until the 10th trading day after IPOs. In our sample, the first-day closing 
price of only one firm, Formosa International Hotel, reached the seven percent price 
limit. The first-day closing prices of two firms, Ritz Landis Hotel and Phoenix Tours, fell 
below their offer prices. It seems that the marker response to the first travel agency to list 
on the ROSE was not so positive. Moreover, the first-day closing price of Royal Chihpen 
Hotel is equal to its offer price. It is therefore an interesting topic to answer the question 
of whether the smaller degree of underpricing in tourism IPOs indicates less information 
asymmetry6 Firms in the tourism industry especially in the hotel segment, are generally 
characterized by stable cash flows, and none of the listed hotel firms in Taiwan has ever 
been delisted from an exchange due to financial problems. Further research may help 
clarify this issue. 
Tables 3 and 4 examine the returns based on longer time frames assuming the new 
issues are bought at the offer price and first-day closing price, respectively. After holding 
the IPO stocks for 1,2, and 8 weeks, there are four individual investments with negative 
returns, regardless of whether they are bought at the offer or the first-day closing price. The 
average eight-week return is 36.60 percent with a reward ratio of 0.33 if based on the 
offer price. However, the range of returns in the tourism industry is dramatic. Leofoo 
Development shows the most astonishing price performance, and its eight-week hold- 
ing-period return is as high as 339.39 percent and 319.08 percent if purchased at the offer 
and the first-day closing price, respectively. The company's offer price was NT$33, but 
two months later its closing price was NT$112 on February 24, 1989. Even after treating 
this firm as an outlier and omitting it from the calculation, the average eight-week return 
for the remaining nine firms is still a positive 2.96 percent. The same number falls to 0.10 
percent if the investments are made at the first day's closing price. Again, the returns 
seem to imply that most IPOs are more underpriced at the offer price, which support past 
studies in this field. 
Baron (1982), Rock (1986), and Beatty and Ritter (1986) propose that the asymmetrical infor- 
mation problem may be a factor forcing underwriters to deliberately underprice IPOs. 
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Table 3 
After-IPO holding period return (%) based on offer price 
Firm Name 1-week close %week close 4-week close &week close 




Formosa International Hotel 
Holiday Entertainment 
Listed on the ROSE 
Janfusun Fancy World 
Tung Ho Development 
Ritz Landis Hotel 
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Table 4 
After-IPO holding period return (%) based on first-day closing price 
Firm Name 1-week close 2-week close &week close 8-week close 
Listed on the TSE 
Ambassador Hotel -10.68 -14.56 -24.27 -21.36 
Leofoo Development 17.05 51.73 64.74 319.08 
First Hotel 46.81 56.74 41.84 0.00 
Formosa International Hotel -8.99 -7.46 -6.36 -12.72 
Holiday Entertainment -14.25 -14.50 -14.00 2.00 
Listed on the ROSE 
Janfusun Fancy World 26.09 32.61 48.91 47.83 
Tung Ho Development 17.27 8.63 9.35 13.67 
Ritz Landis Hotel 6.01 2.12 1.06 -13.43 
Royal Chihpen Hotel -13.08 -20.38 -11.54 -3.85 






In order to further examine the long-term post-IPO performance, Table 5 reports the 
one-year holding-period return, corresponding market- ortfolio return, and market-ad- 
justed return following lFOs based on Equation 5?The average one-year market 
adjusted return is 265.13 percent with a minimum of -60.43 percent and a maximum of 
429.02 percent. Leofoo Development sill outperforms the other companies one year after 
its IPO with a market price of NT$215 on December 26, 1989. However, if we again 
remove this outlier, the average one-year market-adjusted return for the others changes 
to -18.63 percent. It seems that the Taiwan's stock markets do not efficiently price tourism 
IPOs in the one-year period. We find evidence to support the suggestion that tourism 
In table 5 we do not perform the usual statistical significance test due to the small number of 
samples. 
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Conclusions 
This paper studies the short-run and long-run share performance of initial public 
offerings in Taiwan's tourism industry during the period from 1982 to 2002 and 
compares the results to the overall IPO markets in Taiwan, the tourism IPOs in the US., 
and the overall IPO markets in the U.S. as well. The purpose is to further examine if the 
special characteristics embedded in tourism IPOs make underwriters and investors price 
the tourism IPOs differently from the manufacturing or service industries that are listed 
on the two stock exchanges in Taiwan. We believe that the results and comparisons are 
useful to both entrepreneurs and general investors as well. 
We have witnessed a wave of tourism firms rushing to list their stocks on the two 
organized stock exchanges in Taiwan over the past few years. These newly-listed firms 
come from almost every segment of the tourism industry Our empirical results exhibit 
short-run price underperformance in tourism IPOs similar to those reported in the other 
industry segments of IPOs. However, the underpricing shows a wide degree of variation 
and is more severe when the IPOs are purchased at the initial-offer price, and the magni- 
tude is also smaller than the overall IPO markets in Taiwan. Comparing our results to 
similar studies in the US., the degree of underpricing in Taiwan's tourism IPOs is 
smaller as well. We believe that the difference can be partly attributed to the particular 
industrial characteristics of tourism firms relative to the other firms, as well as to the 
unique trading mechanism in Taiwan. We intend to leave this doubt to future research. 
We also find that the subsequent long-run performance of tourism IPOs is quite poor. 
Although such IPO underperformance has been widely documented and appears to be 
internationally pervasive, this phenomenon is not consistent with the overall post-IPO 
performances usually observed in Taiwan's stock markets. It is suggested that perhaps 
further research may help clarify the determinants of why tourism IPOs exhibit a differ- 
ent price pattern in the long run. 
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